

**REPORT BY THE CHANNEL TUNNEL
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON
SAFETY IN THE CHANNEL TUNNEL FIXED
LINK DURING 2011**

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A - Scope of the report

1. This report contains information relating to the activities of the Channel Tunnel Intergovernmental Commission (IGC) in its role as the safety authority for the Channel Fixed Link (the Channel Tunnel) within the terms of the European Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC). The IGC's responsibilities extend only to the area of the Fixed Link as described in the Treaty of Canterbury between the United Kingdom and France and the Concession Agreement between the two Governments and the Concessionaires. This report covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2011.

2. As this report was written in English the optional summary in that language has not been prepared. A French translation has been prepared and submitted to ERA together with the English document as it is the policy of the IGC to make all of its documents which are in the public domain available in both English and French. Readers of the French version who wish to consult the optional summary in English are invited to refer to the full English version which includes a summary.

B - Introductory Section

3. **Introduction** - The Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC as amended) makes provision for a binational body entrusted by Member States to ensure a unified safety regime for specialised cross-border infrastructures to take on the tasks of “national safety authority”. This provision has been applied in respect of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link and the United Kingdom and France have agreed that the IGC should be the “national safety authority”. This report is prepared in accordance with Article 18 of the Directive and, so far as possible, conforms to the template and guidance issued by the European Railway Agency (ERA) with a view to providing a common structure and content for such reports. It is submitted to ERA as required by the Directive but its intended audience is anybody with an interest in the safety of the Fixed Link or similar infrastructures.

4. **Railway Structure Information** - The railway infrastructure of the Channel Tunnel comprises the twin bore tunnel rail link under the English Channel between Cheriton in Kent and Fréthun in the Pas-de-Calais, together with the terminal areas on either side. The terminal areas include the high speed lines linking the tunnel with the UK and French national networks; the loops and the platforms used for the loading and unloading of the tourist and HGV shuttle trains; and the yards and maintenance facilities and their associated links to the rest of the infrastructure.

5. **Infrastructure Manager** - A network map and information about Eurotunnel, the infrastructure manager for the Channel Tunnel, is at **Annex A**.

6. **Railway Undertakings** - The railway undertakings which operated trains through the Channel Tunnel during the period covered by this report were English Welsh & Scottish International Limited (EWSI), DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd, Eurostar International Ltd and Europorte Channel. The address and websites for these companies is at Annex A.3. More detailed information about them appears in the annual reports of the French and UK safety authorities as appropriate.

7. **Summary** - Key safety events in 2011 were as follow:

- A review of the national safety and technical rules relating to rolling stock transiting the tunnel, including consideration of the ERA’s technical opinion on the findings of the review;
- Discussions with potential operators of new services about authorisation for placing vehicles into service, and Part B certification
- Revision of the binational safety regulation for the tunnel, to transpose Directive 2008/57, and the revised Directive 2004/49
- Construction and implementation of procedures for four fire-fighting stations in tunnel.

8. General Trend Analysis - The IGC and the CTSA continued to monitor Eurotunnel's safety management arrangements and safety performance. Many of the Common Safety Indicators reported on in detail at Annex C remain at zero. Eurotunnel's raised its target frequency rate for individual safety events (SPADs, loss of points detection, binding brakes detection, non-respect of CAB signalling, fuel spillages and crossover door incidents) to 300 from 400 the previous year, but failed to reach the new target (experiencing 370 incidents). Collective safety events (emergency braking due to wheelslip or automatic activation and stoppages in the tunnel for more than 30 minutes) were also more than the set objective (84 instead of 65). Lost time accident rates of frequency have however improved on 2010 levels, in respect of both Eurotunnel staff and contractors.

C - Organisation

9. The IGC was established by the Treaty of Canterbury to supervise, in the name and on behalf of the Governments of the UK and the French Republic, all matters concerning the construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel. The functions of the IGC include drawing up, or participating in the preparation of, regulations applicable to the Channel Tunnel.

10. The Treaty of Canterbury also established the CTSA to advise and assist the IGC on all matters concerning safety in the construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel. The functions of the CTSA also include ensuring that the safety measures and practices applicable to the Fixed Link comply with the national and international laws in force; enforcing such laws and monitoring their implementation; and examining reports concerning incidents affecting safety, making investigations and reporting to the IGC.

11. UK and French Secretariats arrange for the preparation and execution of the IGC and the CTSA's decisions.

12. A chart showing the structure of the IGC and its relationships with other bodies is at Annex B.

D - The Development of Railway Safety

D1 – Initiatives to maintain/improve safety performance

Table D.1.1 - Safety measures triggered by accidents/precursors to these

Accidents/precursors which triggered the measure			Safety measure decided
Date	Place	Description of the event	
11/09/2008	Channel Tunnel Interval 6	Fire onboard a shuttle carrying heavy goods vehicles	<i>Construction of fixed fire-fighting equipment in the tunnel was completed in October 2011. These Stations d'Attaque de Feu (SAFE stations) allow a HGV shuttle on fire to be stopped within the tunnel so that the fire can be suppressed and contained by water mist, and subsequently be more easily tackled by the fire and rescue services.</i>

Table D.1.2 - Safety measures with other triggers

Safety measure decided	Description of the trigger of the measures	Safety measure decided
N/A		

D 2 – Detailed Data Trend Analysis

14. There were no fatalities in 2011, but two recorded injuries and one case of shock, all with respect to workers. There was also once occurrence of dangerous goods spillage. There were very few recorded precursors: eight broken rails, six SPADs and one axle lock due to a wheel flat on a Eurotunnel shuttle carrying heavy goods vehicles. A detailed trend analysis related to the CSIs would not therefore be meaningful. An overview of the occurrence of precursor CSIs is below.

	2010	2011
Total number of precursors	18	15
Total number of broken rails	15	8
Total number of track buckles	0	0
Total number of wrong-side signalling failures	0	0
Total number of signals passed at danger	3	6
Total number of broken wheels on rolling stock in service	0	0
Total number of broken axles on rolling stock in service	0	1

15. Within the incidents of signals passed at danger, the increase was due to a rise in the number of SPAD “A”s, that is, those relating to driver error. On each occasion, the driver involved was relieved of duties, and an action plan put in place, the results of which should reduce the frequency of future such incidents.

16. **Common Safety Indicators (CSIs)** – Detailed data relating to the CSIs as defined in the Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC) can be found at Annex C.

D 3 – Results of Safety Recommendations

17. IGC has continued to monitor Eurotunnel’s response to the fire that occurred onboard an HGV shuttle train travelling from the UK to France on 11 September 2008. It is evident that one of the lorries on the shuttle caught fire although the reason for this still remains unknown.

18. Although the fire led to no deaths and only relatively minor injuries, it was recognized that this was a serious accident that required full investigation. A formal investigation into the fire was therefore launched by the French Bureau d’Enquêtes sur les Accidents de Transport Terrestre (BEA-TT) assisted by the UK Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB). The report was received on 16 November 2010.

19. The IGC compiled its annual response to the national investigation body’s report during 2011. The report can be found on the IGC’s website at the following page:

<http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/Fire-of-11-September-2008.html?lang=en>

and found that all but eight of the original 39 recommendations had been closed out. The IGC continues to monitor the outstanding recommendations, which require:

- Further work between the CTSA and Eurotunnel to ensure the reliability of the fire fighting equipment in the tunnel;
- Eurotunnel to consider whether its fire main and valves at fire-fighting stations should be fully automated;
- Eurotunnel to fully analyse its fire detection systems outside of fire-fighting stations;
- Eurotunnel to keep the IGC informed of discussions relating to changes in its relationships with contractors for fire and rescue services;
- Eurotunnel to consider reconfiguration of its electricity supply system;
- the CTSA to monitor Eurotunnel work to maintain its current radio system in advance of the installation of GSM(R); and
- further work to ensure on the reliability of critical systems.

20. Also, as the incidence of serious fires had been materially greater than had been assumed in the risk assessments conducted at the start of operations through the tunnel, the IGC asked the CTSA to consider whether the empirical evidence of increased risk required changes to the safety regime applying to the tunnel. The CTSA's report entitled "Fires in Channel Tunnel on Eurotunnel freight shuttles" was published in December 2011 and can be found at:

<http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/Fire-of-11-September-2008.html?lang=en>

E - Important Changes in Legislation and Regulation

17. **The Regulation of Safety of the Channel Fixed Link** – During the period covered by this report the IGC continued to progress the transposition of the amended Railway Safety Directive (2008/110/EC) and the new Interoperability Directive (2008/57/EC) for the Fixed Link. This work is planned to be concluded by the end of 2012.

18. **Other Significant Regulatory Issues Considered by the IGC and CTSA** - Other important issues considered by the IGC and the CTSA during the course of the year were as follows:

- (i) **Review of specific safety rules for trains transiting the tunnel** – The IGC published the conclusions of its review on 31 March 2010. The IGC asked ERA for a technical opinion on these conclusions in December 2010. The opinion was published in March 2011.

Further to the opinion, the IGC asked to make the necessary changes to its operating rules to remove rules requiring compliance with particular fire protection standards for the design and performance of vehicles and their fittings, and for call buttons at the end of each coach, as these requirements are dealt with by the rolling stock TSIs. It was also decided that trains no longer had to have the ability to be split. Finally, trains were no longer required to be of a particular length; have a through-corridor; and motor units at each end, and applicants were invited to propose such systems with a requisite risk assessment using EC Regulation 352/2009.

The IGC then undertook further analysis of the rules remaining for the tunnel, that rolling stock:

- is able to continue running for 30 minutes while on fire, so that it can exit the tunnel and be brought to a stop in an area where passengers can be evacuated and the fire can be safely fought;
- is able to operate at gradients up to 11/1000, and haul itself from the tunnel from a stand with 50% of traction power available, and to bring a train of the same type out of the tunnel;
- has a driving position at each end of the train and protective measures against fire in the traction elements;
- has effective smoke penetration sealing; and
- operates by electric traction,

including comparing these rules with the revisions of the Safety in Rail Tunnel and Locomotives and Passenger TSIs. ERA's revision work, and the IGC's analysis of its rules, continued into 2012.

- (ii) **Discussions with railway undertakings and rolling stock manufacturers** – During the course of the year the IGC and the CTSA engaged in discussions with railway undertakings and rolling stock manufacturers about the requirements upon them to obtain technical authorisation and Part B certification for operation through the tunnel.
- (iii) **Participation in the work of the European Railway Agency and its working groups** – The IGC and the CTSA continued to play a full part in the work of the European Railway Agency (ERA) and its various working groups. Given their limited resources it has been necessary for the IGC and the CTSA to participate directly in those activities which were of the greatest interest and, for other activities, to rely on liaison with, and feedback from, experts from the UK and French safety authorities. Nevertheless, the IGC and CTSA continued to play an active part in meetings of the ERA Network of National Safety Authorities and in working groups and workshops dealing with common safety methods for monitoring and supervision, SRT TSI revision, and cross-acceptance. In addition, the IGC and the CTSA continued to give careful consideration to all questionnaires and surveys received from the ERA and made substantive responses wherever it was considered that IGC could add expertise and value to the agency's investigations.

F - The Development of Safety Certification and Authorisation

1. National legislation – starting dates – availability

19. The Railway Safety Directive is transposed for the tunnel through a binational regulation of 24 January 2007, which came into force on 4 July 2008 through statutory instrument 2007-3531 in the UK and Decret 2008-748 in France. The guidelines on the application of regulation can be found on the IGC website at the following page:

<http://www.channeltunneligc.co.uk/Regulations-and-guidance,25.html?lang=en>.

20. Under the transitional provisions in the binational regulation, accepted safety cases for the railway undertakings which operate through the Fixed Link were deemed to be Part B safety certificates for a period of up to two years (i.e. until 4 July 2010). Hence, the IGC issued new certificates during 2010 for all operators until the expiry of their Part A certificates from other national safety authorities, all in 2012.

21. The company Europorte 2 was similarly issued with a certificate until October 2012. However, the company became Europorte Channel at the end of 2010, and applied for a new Part B certificate at that time, issued by the IGC on 1 April 2011. Numerical data on certification and procedure can be found at Annex E.

G - Supervision of Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers

22. The 1986 Treaty of Canterbury places responsibility on the CTSA to ensure that the safety measures and practices applicable to the Fixed Link comply with the national or international laws in force, to enforce such laws, to monitor their implementation and to report to the Intergovernmental Commission. It also states that for the purpose of carrying out its functions, the Safety Authority may invoke the assistance of the authorities of each Government or any body or expert of its choice and that the two Governments shall grant to the Safety Authority and its members and agents such powers of investigation, inspection and direction as are necessary for the performance of its functions. The Concession Agreement states that the Concessionaires shall afford access to all parts of the Fixed Link to persons duly authorised by the IGC or, under its supervision, by the CTSA, for the purposes of any of their functions, to inspect the Fixed Link and to investigate any matter relating to its construction or operation and shall afford such persons the facilities necessary for the performance of these functions.

1.1 Audits/Inspections/Checklists

23. The current five-year (2009-14) inspection and audit programme has been drawn up to take account of the key elements included in Eurotunnel's Safety Management System (SMS). The programme will cover the lifespan of the SMS during which the

inspections and audits will need to lead to positive conclusions so that the SMS can be validated before Eurotunnel submits its next dossier for Authorisation in 2014.

24. The following supervision methods were used during 2011:

- Inspections of both Eurotunnel and railway undertakings (a list of topics covered is below);
- Flow of information – regular reports from Eurotunnel such as the daily Operations Duty Manager (ODM) reports; monthly summaries of safety events (known as ‘Flash reports’); Safety Committee Minutes; Operating Performance reports etc;
- Information gained from the investigation of accidents and incidents;
- Audit reports (both internal and external);
- Ad-hoc meetings between Eurotunnel and Safety Authority experts;
- Meetings with the Railway Undertakings;
- Information from Eurotunnel concerning the interface with the railway undertakings and change management.

1.2 Vigilance aspects/sensitive points to follow-up by the NSA

26. Inspections over the course of the year gave rise to 42 recommendations which were formally communicated to Eurotunnel (and where appropriate to the railway undertakings) by the CTSA. These included:

- that further consideration is given by Eurotunnel to the introduction of a policy on fire protection for plant and equipment used for underground construction;
- that practical hands-on training of fire extinguishers should be reinstated for all initial train crew and a programme of suitable continuation training given;
- that annual testing of the capability of equipment to produce and spray foam should take place;
- that Eurotunnel examine options for incorporating transport operations involving hazardous goods on board goods trains in the ISIS system based on data already recorded by staff, and communicate this more clearly to second line of response fire and rescue services;
- that Eurotunnel establish a programme for undertaking and tracking remedial work to the catenary support steelwork; and
- that regular exercising of the emergency response area procedures for key players (staff and emergency response officers) is held so that they conversant with their roles and acquire competency and confidence in these procedures.

The recommendations were added to a consolidated log of recommendations to enable the CTSA to monitor and review with Eurotunnel its progress in taking suitable action in response to them.

2. Description of the coverage of the legal aspects within the annual reports from the railway undertakings and the infrastructure managers – availability of the annual reports before 30 June [according to Article 9(4) of the Railway Safety Directive]

The infrastructure manager and railway undertakings reported on their activities in accordance with the requirements of Article 9(4) and Annex I of the Railway Safety Directive. Only EWSI and DB Schenker's reports were received shortly after 30 June, but the slightly late submission did not hinder IGC's ability to prepare this report.

3. Inspections

25. Planned inspection activity continued to be based on areas identified by the CTSA's experts during their analysis of the Eurotunnel's SMS. However, inspection plans retained sufficient flexibility to respond to areas which emerged from Eurotunnel's activities during the course of the year.

26. In total, 17 inspections were undertaken by CTSA experts on the following topics:

- The condition of the French electricity sub-station at Coquelles
- The construction of four fire-fighting stations within the tunnel
- The water-supply system to the four fire-fighting stations
- Inspection of the terminals and discussion on tunnel lining, geotechnical, structural and highway engineering monitoring (three inspections)
- Train crew working on Eurotunnel shuttles carrying passenger vehicles
- emergency sidings on the UK side of the tunnel (two inspections) and emergency reception area procedures (one inspection)
- Eurotunnel's technical training and procedures for maintenance
- Eurotunnel's ability to notify fire and rescue services in the event of a communications failure
- Loading of Eurotunnel shuttles with heavy goods vehicles, including staff carrying out random checks of cabs to prevent fire entering tunnel
- Management of work-related stress
- Eurotunnel's follow-up of French national safety authority audits (two inspections)
- Sub-contractors

4. Audits

During 2011, Eurotunnel undertook 28 internal audits. Of particular note was an audit of freight procedures for the carriage of dangerous good. The four railway undertakings undertook 17 internal audits in total on procedures for train crew, at depots and in signalling centres.

5. Summary of the relevant corrective measures/actions (amendment, revocation, suspension, important warning, etc.) related to safety aspects following these audits/inspections

The CTSA undertook extensive work with Eurotunnel in 2011 to ensure the success of the project to construct and start operation of new fire-fighting stations, including two of the inspections above. As part of this work, fire and rescue, civil engineering and railway safety experts made several recommendations to Eurotunnel to ensure the final submission for operation included:

- Provision of detailed information on the robustness of the power supply system in the event of a fire;
- Development of a formal stoppage procedure;
- Provision of detailed information relating to the catenary automatic switching and earthing equipment and the control system performance level of the safety functions performing the catenary earthing arrangements;
- Development of intervention strategies and training for fire-fighting stations with emergency response officers.

This preparatory work allowed the IGC to accept Eurotunnel's submission for operation of the stations, and monitor Eurotunnel's actions on any outstanding actions into 2012.

Two inspections undertaken by Safety Authority experts were to monitor Eurotunnel's response to audits by the French national safety authority. These inspections found that the work done had been satisfactory and required no further recommendations.

27. Overall the inspection programme for 2011 and other monitoring and supervision activities undertaken during the course of the year provided sufficient evidence to conclude that, while there was a continuing need for vigilance, the operation of the Fixed Link continued to be acceptably safe.

H. Reporting on the application of the CSM on risk evaluation and assessment

28. As Eurotunnel's work on constructing SAFE stations in the tunnel (completed in October 2011) was begun before the CSM came into force in June 2010, it was not used as the basis of its risk evaluation and assessment.

29. The IGC asked both Eurotunnel and operators to apply the CSM for risk assessment of new or significantly altered rolling stock to be placed into service in the tunnel. It will report on this experience in its report for 2012.

I - IGC Conclusions on Year 2011 – Priorities

29. The Channel Tunnel railway is of immense importance, carrying over ten million passengers between Britain and France each year and connecting Britain to the high speed rail network of the European mainland. As a 54 kilometre long undersea tunnel, its operation poses specific safety risks, in particular the dangers involved if there is a fire or if passengers are trapped in the tunnel for long periods due to breakdown. It is therefore right that close attention should be paid to the safety regulation of the Fixed Link.

30. Priority issues of concern into the future include:

- the clarification of all safety and technical rules for the tunnel so that they can be notified and published according to the safety and interoperability directives in force;
- the consideration of applications to authorise new rolling stock to run through the tunnel and applications for the certification of railway undertakings proposing to run new services through the tunnel;
- continued transposition for the tunnel of new European law, including amendments to the Railway Safety Directive 2004/49, requirements relating to interoperability, and any new requirements arising from the work of the European Railway Agency (ERA) or the further development of the European system of Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs), in particular the Safety in Rail Tunnels TSI;
- development of a risk-based supervision strategy for infrastructure and rolling stock operations in line with the common safety method for supervision; and
- preparation to deal with serious safety incidents, including through the annual rehearsal of the binational emergency plan, which provides the framework for the co-operation of the emergency response organisations of both countries in the event of an accident or incident in the tunnel, particularly in the run-up to the 2012 Olympic Games in London.

J - Sources of Information

31. The following sources were used when drafting this report:

- Eurotunnel Annual Report on Health and Safety for 2011
- Europorte Channel's Annual Safety Report for 2011
- Eurostar Annual Safety Report for 2011
- EWSI Annual Safety Report for 2011
- DB Schenker Annual Safety Report for 2011

K - Annexes

ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

ANNEX B: IGC Structure and Relationships

ANNEX C: Data on Common Safety Indicators (separate Excel spreadsheet)

ANNEX C1: Safety related incidents previously included in reports by the CTSA


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
ANNEX A: Railway Structure Information

A.1. Network map

Network Map Showing Layout of UK Terminal and Running Tunnels



Network Map Showing Layout of French Terminal



A.2 Information about Eurotunnel - The Infrastructure Manager for the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link

Name: Eurotunnel

Address: UK Terminal, Ashford Road, Folkestone, Kent CT18 8XX

Website: www.eurotunnel.com

Network Statement Link:

<http://www.eurotunnelfreight.com/uploadedFiles/freight/2012-Network-Statement.pdf>

Start Date of Commercial Activity: May 1994

Total Track Length: 159 km main tracks plus 50 km secondary tracks

Track Gauge: UIC

Electrified Track Length: All track both main and secondary is electrified

Voltages: 25,000 volts alternating current

Total Double/Single Length Track: 100% double track

Total Track Length – High Speed Line: 108 km

Automatic Train Protection Equipment Used: TVM 430

Number of Level Crossings: None on main tracks

Number of Signals: 655

A.3 Information about the Railway Undertakings

The railway undertakings which operated trains through the Fixed Link in 2009 were as follow:

Name: DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd

Address: Lakeside Business Park
Carolina Way
Doncaster
South Yorkshire
DN4 5PN
UK

Website: www.rail.dbschenker.co.uk

Name: Eurostar International Ltd

Address: Times House
Bravingtons Walk
Regent Quarter
London
N1 9AW
UK

Website: www.eurostar.com

Name: Europorte Channel

Address: Tour de Lille
60 Bd de Turin
Euralille


59777 Lille

France

Website: www.europorte.com

ANNEX B: IGC STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS

IGC Structure



Each Government appoints half the members of the IGC which comprises 16 members including at least two representatives of the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority (CTSA).

The composition of the CTSA is determined by the two Governments by agreement and each Government appoints half of its members. In 2011, the CTSA had ten members in total, and its work was supported by 28 advisers, inspectors and auditors.

It should be noted that in 2011, both the Head of the UK delegation and the Head of the French delegation to the CTSA changed.

ANNEX C: DATA ON COMMON SAFETY INDICATORS

Data on Common Safety Indicators for 2011 is shown in a separate “Excel” file.

ANNEX C1: SAFETY RELATED INCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED IN REPORTS PUBLISHED BY THE CTSA

Total number of events reports to the CTSA in 2011 = 64

Fuel Spillages	= 18
Unscheduled stops greater than 30 minutes	= 25
Track/rail problems	= 2
SPAD As (Driver)	= 5
SPAD Cs (Operator Error)	= 1
Catenary trips	= 2
Fire/Smoke	= 4
Injuries	= 3
Damaged Axle	= 1
Derailment	= 0
Uncoupling	= 0
Runaway train	= 1
Emergency door open on departure	= 0
Clandestine intrusion	= 0
Dangerous goods spillage	= 1

ANNEX D: Important changes in legislation and regulation

	Legal reference	Date legislation comes into force	Reason for introduction (Additionally specify new law or amendment to existing legislation)	Description
General national railway safety legislation	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Legislation concerning the national safety authority	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Legislation concerning notified bodies, assessors, third parties bodies for registration, examination, etc.	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
National rules concerning railway safety				
Rules concerning national safety targets and methods	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements on safety management systems and safety certification of Railway Undertakings	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements on safety management systems and Safety Authorisation of Infrastructure Managers	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for wagonkeepers	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for maintenance workshops	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for the authorisation of placing in service and maintenance of new and substantially altered rolling stock, including rules for exchange of rolling stock between Railway Undertakings, registration systems and requirements on testing procedures	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Common operating rules of the railway network, including rules relating to the signalling and traffic procedures	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules laying down requirements on additional internal operating rules (company rules) that must be established by the Infrastructure Managers and Railway Undertakings	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A

Rules concerning requirements on staff executing safety critical tasks, including selection criteria, medical fitness and vocational training and certification	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning the investigation of the and incidents including recommendation	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for national safety indicators including how to collect and analyse the indicators	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rules concerning requirements for authorisation of placing in service the infrastructure (tracks, bridges, tunnels, energy, ATC, radio, signalling, interlocking, level crossing, platforms, etc.)	NONE	N/A	N/A	N/A

Annex E: The development of safety certification and authorisation – Numerical Data

E.1. Safety Certificates according to Directive 2001/14/EC

Number of Safety Certificates issued according to Directive 2001/14/EC, held by Railway Undertakings in year 2011	being licensed in your Member State	0
	being licensed in another Member State	0

E.2. Safety Certificates according to Directive 2004/49/EC

		New	Updated / amended	Renewed
E.2.1. Number of valid Safety Certificates Part A held by Railway Undertakings in the year 2011	being registered in your Member State	0	0	0
	being registered in another Member State	0	0	0

		New	Updated / amended	Renewed
E.2.2. Number of valid Safety Certificates Part B held by Railway Undertakings in the year 2011	being registered in your Member State	7	0	0
	being registered in another Member State	0	0	0

			A	R	P
E.2.3. Number of applications for Safety Certificates Part A submitted by Railway Undertakings in year 2011	being registered in your Member State for	new certificates	0	0	0
		updated / amended certificates	0	0	0
		renewed certificates	0	0	0
	being registered in another Member State for	new certificates	0	0	0
		updated / amended certificates	0	0	0
		renewed certificates	0	0	0

			A	R	P
E.2.4. Number of applications for Safety Certificates	being registered in your Member State for	new certificates	0	0	0
		updated / amended certificates	1	0	1

Part B submitted by Railway Undertakings in year 2011		renewed certificates	3	0	0
	being registered in another Member State for	new certificates	0	0	0
		updated / amended certificates	0	0	0
		renewed certificates	0	0	0

A = Accepted application, certificate is already issued
R = Rejected applications, no certificate was issued
P = Case is still pending, no certificate was issued so far

E.2.5. List of countries where RUs applying for a Safety Certificate Part B in your Member State have obtained their Safety Certificate Part A

UK (DBS, EWSI and EIL)

France (EPC)

E.3. Safety Authorisations according to Directive 2004/49/EC

	New	Updated / amended	Renewed
E.3.1. Number of valid Safety Authorisations held by Infrastructure Managers in the year 2011 being registered in your Member State	1	0	0

		A	R	P
E.3.2. Number of applications for Safety Authorisations submitted by Infrastructure Managers in year 2011 being registered in your Member State	new authorisations	0	0	0
	updated / amended authorisations	0	0	0
	renewed authorisations	0	0	0

A = Accepted application, authorisation is already issued
R = Rejected applications, no authorisation was issued
P = Case is still pending, no authorisation was issued so far

E.4. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part A

		New	Updated / amended	Renewed
Mean time after having received all necessary information between the receipt of an application and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate Part A in year 2011 for Railway Undertakings	being registered in your Member State	N/A	N/A	N/A
	being registered in another Member State	N/A	N/A	N/A

E.5. Procedural aspects – Safety Certificates part B

		New	Updated / amended	Renewed
Mean time after having received all necessary information between the receipt of an application and the final delivery of a Safety Certificate Part B in year 2011 for Railway Undertakings	being registered in your Member State	N/A	N/A	N/A
	being registered in another Member State	112 days	N/A	N/A

E.6. Procedural aspects – Safety Authorisations

		New	Updated / amended	Renewed
Mean time after having received all necessary information between the receipt of an application and the final delivery of a Safety Authorisation in year 2011 for Infrastructure Managers	being registered in your Member State	N/A	N/A	N/A
	being registered in another Member State	N/A	N/A	N/A